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                                  Toward a Relational Humanism 
 
            Kenneth J. Gergen 
           Swarthmore College 
 
    Brief Abstract 
 
 Humanist conceptions of the person evolve across history. While humanism has 
 served a pivotal role in the care-giving professions, its individualist emphasis now 
 stands as an impediment to its future. Proposed is a relational re-conceptualization 
 of the person, placing relational as opposed to individual well-being in the 
 forefront of our concerns. 
 
The history of Humanism is an uneven one, marked by diverse and contradictory 
influences. Its philosophic assumptions, values, and associated practices have shifted 
markedly across centuries and cultures (Davies, 1997). During the 1600’s, Renaissance 
humanists  attempted to revive the social values of classical Greece, with their emphasis 
on enhancing  communal harmony through education. In certain respects, this view of 
education is echoed in the current concept of the Humanities in higher education, and 
stands in significant contrast to the Sciences. In the late 1800’s, however, the European  
humanist movement became important in defining the human being as a natural as 
opposed to a spiritual being, thus challenging the hegemony of the Church as the arbiter 
of worldly knowledge. In this sense, humanists stood firmly in the Enlightenment 
tradition. Humanists such as John Dewey advocated humanism as a form of secular 
religion.  The powers of human reason, along with ethics and social equality, were 
emphasized (Wilson, 1995). As humanism came to find a home within 20th century social 
science, it carried with it a fundamental tension. Similar to the natural sciences, 
humanists were committed to a concept of knowledge based on reason and experience. At 
the same time, in contrast to the positivist science, they were deeply engaged in issues of 
individual and social value. Thus, as most of us would recognize it today, the humanist 
tradition has primarily functioned as a resistance movement to the materialist/positivist 
reductionism otherwise dominating the study of human behavior (Waterman, 2013). Such 
resistance has carried with it a range of assumptions and values that have inspired 
theoretical inquiry, wide-ranging research, and valued forms of practice – particularly 
within the fields of therapy and counseling.  
 To touch on central elements of the resistance, while the mainstream behavioral 
sciences define the mind in terms of cognitive/neuro mechanics, humanists have placed 
personal experience toward the center of their concerns. Where the positivists have 
embraced deterministic explanations, humanists have honored human agency. Thus, 
where behaviorally oriented scientists view impersonal experimentation as the optimal 
research method, humanists see empathic interpretation of others’ experience as pivotal 
to understanding. Where positivists have attempted to avoid issues of moral and 
ideological significance, humanists continue to sustain the moral and ethical concerns of 
early humanism. Thus, humanists are often concerned with issues of social justice, and 
advocate what may be viewed as compassionate understanding for others. One might 
indeed see the humanist orientation today as locked in a “battle for human nature”, as 
Barry Schwartz (1987) might put it. It is a battle over whether we are to understand 
ourselves as machine-like creatures, inextricably driven by forces of heredity and 
environment, or as sentient beings who can draw from our experience and consciously 
decide our courses of action.  
 Yet, as I shall propose in what follows, battles such as this find their origins in 
cultural traditions. Conceptions of human nature are not driven by “what there is,” so 
much as they emerge from historically situated, value invested negotiations among 
people. In this sense we may set aside the longstanding battle over the truth about human 
nature, and begin to inquire more specifically into the consequences of such beliefs on 
social life.  And, while I have personally been a champion of humanist resistance to 
positivist reductionism , I wish now to place the humanist cluster of conceptions under 
critical scrutiny. This is not at all to give way to positivism; its problems remain robustly 
relevant. However, it is to pave the way for a further transformation in the humanist 
legacy. If humanism is to retain its vitality, and sustain some of it most basic concerns – 
including its ethical consciousness and its caring and compassionate orientation to human 
beings - a new turn in the historical wheel is essential. We must explore a new conception 
of the person, and along with it, fresh forms of inquiry and professional practice. We 
must move beyond the role of resistance, to join with broader movements across many 
fields of academic and professional endeavor, movements that emphasize collaborative, 
integrative processes both global and environmental. As I see it, required at this historical 
juncture is the emergence of a relational humanism.  
 In what follows, I will first touch on the constructed character of human nature. 
This will enable us to reconsider our traditions in terms of their social consequences. 
Here I will confront some of the major limitations of contemporary humanism. We can 
then explore what might be entailed in a relational re-working of the conception of the 
person, and how such a conception can bring about a significant flourishing of the 
humanist tradition. I will then touch on implications of a relational humanism for 
practices of research, therapy and counseling, and cultural life more generally.  
 
      The Social Construction of the Person 
 
Any inquiry into human nature must necessarily proceed from specific traditions of 
understanding, their prevailing distinctions, the ways in which questions are constituted, 
and their agreements as to what constitute reasonable answers. The discursive 
conventions constituting these traditions will necessarily lay the groundwork for what it 
is that we can say about human nature and the ways in which our accounts will function 
within the culture. In a broader sense this is to say that there is no “getting it right” with 
respect to the nature of human nature. We cannot step outside all traditions to ask 
questions and offer intelligible replies. Indeed, we may say that the very inquiry into a 
specifically “human” nature is itself derived from a tradition of understanding. It is not a 
question that must be answered in order for us to achieve fundamental knowledge or an 
accurate picture of our condition in the world. In effect, human nature is a cultural 
construction. 
 To view human nature as a cultural construction is in no way to dismiss the 
significance of these discourses in contemporary life. Rather, it is to invite even more 
serious attention to the issues at stake. Accuracy in the matter cannot be our goal. We 
cannot measure our discourses about human nature – humanist vs. mechanist - against a 
set of observations, such that we can determine whether one account is more accurate 
than another. What constitutes a fact or a relevant observation in one tradition will fail to 
do so in another. In the mechanist tradition experience is disregarded, and agency does 
not exist; for humanists, environmental determination does not exist and brain states are 
disregarded. At the same time, conceptions of the “human being” are enormously 
important in their social consequences. Whether we can hold people responsible for their 
actions, hold scientists accountable for the moral and political implications of their work, 
or believe that understanding each other is equivalent to empathy as opposed to 
prediction, are significant issues.  Discussions about what is or is not human nature are 
entries into moral and political deliberation. They inform our professional practices, and 
indeed our ways of living together. We move, then, from accuracy as our criterion of 
concern, to societal consequences.  
    
  The Social Pragmatics of Contemporary Humanism 
 
As we shift our gaze from establishing the essentials of human nature to assaying the 
effects of such beliefs on our forms of life, we begin to ask such questions as: if we 
accept a given view, what is gained or lost from our lives; who is benefited and who 
suffers; what is brought into view, and what is rendered invisible? To be sure, there is 
much to be said in support of the humanist orientation in the social sciences. Both in the 
academic sphere and in practices of therapy, humanism has offered an invaluable counter 
to the hegemonic expansion of modernist mechanistics. There is already a substantial 
body of critique of the socio-political consequences of the mechanistic vision of the 
person (see, for example, Shotter, 2012; May, 1999; Taylor, 1964; Harre and Secord, 
1967). However, given a more pragmatic orientation to truth claims (Hansen, 2007), it is 
also useful to consider the dark side of contemporary humanism, that is, ways in which 
its shared assumptions may be injurious to human well-being. For, in its emphasis on 
individual experience and personal agency, contemporary humanism allies itself closely 
with an individualist orientation to social life.  In this sense, the humanist movement 
lends itself to a range of problematic outcomes. Here I touch on four of these: 
 Social isolation. The humanist conception of the person gives ontological priority 
to individual experience. In terms of what counts about me or you, it is an utterly private 
refuge somewhere behind the eyes.  Yet, if what is most central to us dwells within this 
private sanctuary – mine and mine alone – then you are fundamentally “other” – an alien 
who exists separately from me. I am essentially alone; I came into the world as an 
isolated being and leave alone. Further, you can never fully know or understand my 
private world, for it is never fully available to you, never fully revealed. By the same 
token, if what is most significant about you always lies “behind the mask”, then I can 
never be certain of you, can never know what you are hiding from me, what you truly 
want. Even in our most intimate moments I cannot know what you are truly feeling. In 
this sense, our mutual isolation is locked arm in arm with distrust. Because we cannot be 
certain what lies behind our words and deeds, then suspicion always lies just over the 
shoulder. As Sampson (2008) adds, such an orientation militates against the realization of 
how much we “contain the other” in our actions, and vice versa. Further, it is this sense of 
isolated being that invites us to see the natural world as fundamentally separate from self.  
 Self-obsession. The primacy of experience in contemporary humanism is most 
fully exemplified in therapy and counseling practices centered on the illumination of the 
individual’s interior – the elusive intricacies of thoughts, feelings, motives, emotions and 
so on. To comprehend and to gain control over the interior requires concerted attention. 
In a broader context we have here the basis of what social theorist Christopher Lasch 
(1978) viewed as a cultural narcissism, and the Wallachs (1983) see as a culturally 
pervasive selfishness - a preoccupation with the self and its improvement and enrichment. 
It is this same preoccupation that lends itself to a concern with self-esteem. The 
numerous measures of self esteem to which we are exposed – both directly in terms of 
evaluations and indirectly through the models that beckon from world of advertising – 
continuously remind us of what we are lacking In effect, the deep cultural concern with 
self-esteem owes its origin to the isolation of selves. We don’t “just naturally” worry 
about our self-worth. If we did not construct the world in terms of the significance of the 
individual, worries about self-esteem would evaporate. 
 Relationship deterioration. Consider some common phrases: “We need to work 
on our relationship”, “This relationship is falling apart”, or “We must develop better 
teamwork”. All of these phrases are lodged in the premise that society is made up of 
individual actors. And because the self is the primary reality, relationships are artificial 
and temporary. They must be “built”, “made”, or “repaired”. Indeed, if one is fully 
developed as a self, why should he or she need a relationship? In the celebrated volume 
Habits of the heart, Robert Bellah and his colleagues (1985) propose that the emphasis on 
self expression, freedom, self-development, and self-fulfillment all undermine the kinds 
of social institutions that are central to a viable society. For example, “If love and 
marriage are seen primarily in terms of psychological gratification, they may fail to fulfill 
their older social function of providing people with stable, committed relationships that 
tie them into the larger society” (p. 85). On this account, if one finds that marriage 
frustrates one’s desires for freedom or self-expression there is little reason to remain in 
the marriage. Similarly, with voluntary services or community politics, the individualist 
is likely to view them as siphoning off time that should be spent on achieving one’s 
personal goals. 
 Societal blindness. Because of the belief in ourselves as autonomous decision 
makers, we also inherit a handy way of understanding untoward actions - for example, 
crimes or what we call “mental illness.” In such cases we are led to suspect a fault in the 
internal functioning of the individual. We view crime as a voluntary action, or possibly a 
diminished “sense of right and wrong”. We fail to explore the conditions in which much 
criminal activity originates – poverty, drugs, joblessness, and the like. Similarly, if one is 
suffering from depression, we focus on the individual mind as the site of repair. If one’s 
job is boring and her boss a tyrant, why should she be treated for her feelings of 
depression? Why not change the working conditions? In broader terms the individualist 
presumption operates like a blinder. It is a crude and simplistic way of reacting to 
problem behavior. We fail to explore the broader circumstances in which actions are 
enmeshed, and focus all too intensely on the psychological condition of the single 
individual. Not only is this approach highly limited, but if the broader circumstances of 
our lives are not addressed it could also be disastrous. 
 As we find, when the individual agent is the irreducible atom of society, we invite 
isolation, distrust, narcissism, the erosion of relationships, and a stunting simplification of 
the problems we confront. This does not at all mean abandoning the vision of 
contemporary humanism. From the standpoint of a reflective pragmatism, there is much 
that can be said in support of an individualist orientation. Why should we ever wish to 
abandon its discourse and related conventions? The challenge here is not replacement, 
but adding significant dimension to our forms of life.  Let us, then, explore the potentials 
of a reconstructed humanism. It is to this possibility that I now turn. 
 
              The Priority of Relational Process 
 
As proposed, concepts of human nature are socially negotiated constructions. Let us 
expand on this assumption, as we may locate here a promising route to a re-visioning of 
humanism. For, what has been advanced in the account of human nature, also applies to 
our understanding our world more generally. Whatever exists requires no particular 
account of it, no particular valuing, or any particular course of action. Our actions in all 
cases are premised on negotiated assumptions and values that in turn, point the way to 
what we take to be rational action. Such proposals lie somewhere toward the heart of 
social constructionist theorizing more generally (Gergen, 1994). The important point for 
the present undertaking, however, is the pivotal place of social process as opposed to 
individual functioning in directing the course of human action. As wide-ranging scholars 
now ask, can we find a means of replacing the individualist account of human action with 
one in which social process is primary? (See, for example, Harre, 1993; Kirschner and 
Martin, 2010; Burkitt, 2008; Slife, 2004; Westerman, 2013). Historically speaking, the 
challenge is not new. Many draw sustenance from the early works of George Herbert 
Mead (1934) and Lev Vygotsky (1981). For Mead, persons are related via a subjective or 
symbolic interdependence; for Vygotsky cultural action forms the basis of what he 
viewed as “higher mental processes.” Yet, it is important to note that for both these 
theorists a dualist premise is maintained – an inside the head psychology as against an 
outside the head, physical world. For both Mead and Vygotsky, the inside acquires its 
content from relations with others. However, the “inside” retains its ontological primacy 
– as prior to relationship. Much the same may be said for the increasing number of 
humanist expansions of the relational dimension (Hansen, 2005; O’Dwyer, 2009; 
Spinelli, 2014). While challenging in potential, the social world is constituted by 
independent agents.  
 In my view, we proceed more fruitfully by abandoning the dualist tradition 
altogether. This is not only to escape the range of intractable philosophic problems 
inherent in dualism (Rorty, 1979). Rather, once we posit an inner world as an essence of 
the individual, we have already constructed a society of independent entities, with the 
challenge of forging a secondary existence of relationships. So let us attempt to 
understand relational process as primary, in which case the very idea of a private mind is 
a cultural construction. In effect, it is out of relational process that all meaning emerges. 
An illustration is helpful:  
 Consider: a client speaks at length of her anger at her husband’s irresponsibility. 
How might a therapist respond? She might, for one, pause, and ask, “Can you tell me 
some ways your husband is actually responsible” As a second possibility, she might say,  
“How often do you have these feelings anger?” As a third possibility, she might inquire, 
“You know, I wonder if it’s not really anger you are feeling, but an insecurity; it just gets 
expressed as anger.” What then has the client expressed? The first therapist has given 
attention to the husband’s behavior; anger recedes into the background.” The second has 
brought the client’s anger into focus, and the husband’s behavior recedes in importance. 
Yet, the third therapist has treated her words of anger as expressions of insecurity. So, 
what then has the client expressed? It depends on the therapist’s reply. The client 
furnishes the possibility for meaning, but the shape of this meaning is furnished by the 
therapist. At the same time, the therapist’s words only make sense in light of what the 
client has spoken. None of these responses would make sense if the client had simply 
been staring at the ceiling. In effect, neither client nor therapist makes sense without the 
other, and the particular sense that results requires the coordination of their efforts. 
Elsewhere (Gergen, 2009) I have described this process as co-action – neither action nor 
reaction, but coordinated action. 
 Yet, neither the actions of the client nor the therapist depend on the interchange in 
itself. Both are participants in conversational traditions, and their ability to generate 
intelligibility depends on their compliance with the relevant rituals of conversation that 
precede them. If the client entered the room and requested a menu, this would be 
unintelligible to the therapist; and, should the therapist ask the client for the wine list, 
such an action would be similarly nonsensical. Their coordination in the therapy room is 
already prepared by their participation in preceding traditions. Or, more generally, we not 
only require each other to ‘make meaning’, but we also depend on a preceding tradition 
of social coordination. 
 From this account we may conclude that the individual is not the origin of the 
meaning of his or her actions, but meaning takes shape within a continuous process of 
coordinated action – one that both precedes and follows the actions themselves. Nor 
should we confine the process of generating meaning to linguistic collaboration alone. 
Coordination will often include bodily movements, such as posture, gaze, or gesture - 
often be more significant than verbal content. Further, the process of coordination may 
also include surrounding objects, along with particular contexts of space and time. In the 
same way that coordination in the use of words brings them into meaning, so are the 
various objects with which we surround ourselves brought into significance. This ‘cup’ 
becomes a vessel for drinking tea; this ‘clock’ a device for counting time together. 
Drawing from Wittgenstein (1953), meaning issues from the forms of life in which we 
are collectively engaged. Within this process all that we take to be real, rational and good 
is brought into being. All that we take to be significant in life, to be sacred, objectively 
true, or worthy of commitment is born within relational process. 
 
   The Humanist Vocabulary Re-visited 
 
As I am proposing, a relational orientation sustains the humanist concern with human 
meaning (Hansen, 2005). However, in this case, the site of human meaning is not within 
the minds of single individuals, but issues from relational process. As noted, the concept 
of “mental process” is essentially a construction that emerges from the process of co-
action. It follows that we do not speak about “private experience,” “agency,” and the like 
because they are free-standing phenomena that demand our description and explanation. 
Rather, it is within our process of co-action that these become meaningful words. For 
many humanists this proposal would appear to eliminate the tradition. If all  words that 
refer to the private world of the mind are cultural constructions, then what is left of the 
humanist tradition? Yet, it is important to realize that this lament is lodged within a 
dualist tradition, one that views our discourse of describing or expressing events within 
the mind. But what if the discourse of the mind does not refer to a mental world at all? 
What if that is not its function in social life?   
 Consider: When I report that I am feeling happy, or sad, for example, I am not 
somehow looking inward and giving a report on the state of my mind.  Rather, these 
words acquire their meaning from their use within the process of co-action. If I extend 
my hand to you, you may well grasp and shake it in a greeting. In the same way, if I 
express anger at what you are doing, you may change your behavior; and if I express my 
admiration of your accomplishments, you may smile in appreciation. All constitute the 
micro-dances of social life. When we proclaim our anger, love, or depression, we are not 
reporting on our state of mind (or neurons), but are engaging in a full bodied relational 
action. Our actions from this standpoint, are not driven, motivated, intended, or otherwise 
fashioned by an inner world, but acquire their very intelligibility as actions only in 
relational process. What we take to be private experience when we “feel” anger, 
depression, love, and so on in the quiet of our own room is essentially a minimal form of 
public action. It is relational action, without public display.  
 From this standpoint, we do not relinquish the humanist vocabulary of the person. 
It is reformulated in terms of relational process. To appreciate the possibilities of this 
re/visioning of the mind, consider the process of rational thought.  It is impossible both 
conceptually and experientially to identify rational thought inside the head. There is no 
way in which Descartes could know that he was thinking. But when we observe people’s 
actions, there is often little problem in distinguishing between rational and irrational 
behavior. We see “getting an education” as rational, and “driving on the wrong side of 
the highway” as irrational. Our confidence in drawing these conclusions is fully 
dependent on our participation in social process. Our judgments issues from social 
traditions of which we are a part; we live in a culture that indexes these actions as rational 
or irrational. Now let us apply this line of reasoning to two concepts central to 
contemporary humanism.   
 
Agency: Intention as Action 
 
The conception of the individual as a free, but ultimately responsible agent is central to 
both contemporary humanism and Western culture more generally.  We prize our 
capacity to choose, to direct our actions according to our decisions. And by holding 
people responsible for their actions, we feel the grounds are established for a moral 
society. The idea of an inner source of action can be traced to Aristotle. As he reasoned, 
there must be an active force that animates the otherwise lifeless body. To this force he 
assigned the concept of what is generally translated as “psyche.” The psyche possesses 
the “power of producing both movement and rest.” Over later centuries the concept was 
incorporated into Christian theology as “the soul.”  To commit a sin, within this tradition, 
is to act voluntarily, thus bringing the soul into a state of impurity. With the 
Enlightenment, the concept of soul was secularized. The soul was reconceptualized as 
mind, and the concept of sin replaced by crime. One can only engage in a criminal act 
intentionally, that is, as an exercise of voluntary or conscious mind.  In effect, we can 
trace the contemporary value placed on “free will” to the Christian tradition and the 
significance it placed on the soul as the center of being. Given the social origins of the 
concept, a space is now opened to reconceptualize agency in a relational frame. 
 While we cannot observe agency – either in ourselves or others -  we do have 
actions in which public claims to agency (or its lack) are commonly made, for example:  
 That was not my intention 
 What are you trying to do? 
 I chose the second alternative. 
 I meant no harm.  
 My purpose in doing this is… 
 But why should we suppose that in uttering such phrases we are giving a report on 
an inner state of mind? Or as Judith Butler (1990) asks, why should we presume there is a 
“doer behind the deed”? Abandoning the presumption of intentions as “in the head,” it is 
now useful to consider the way intentionality discourse functions in daily life. For 
example, the phrase, “I didn’t intend to hurt you” may function to prevent retaliation; to 
say, “he had the best of intentions” is to give someone the benefit of the doubt; to 
pronounce, “I mean what I say” informs the listener to take this seriously. In effect, the 
discourse of intentions is critical to the contours of social life. Depending on the account, 
we may be forgiven, honored, or possibly executed. 
 Of course, we also say that we can recognize our intentions, and can do so with 
great certainty. If intention is a discursive activity, how can we be certain that an action is 
accidental (for example, backing into another car), as opposed to purposeful? Here it is 
useful to consider what is taking place when we “recognize our intentions.” With 
confidence we can rely on social convention to describe what we are doing. When I am 
standing before a class I am justified in recognizing my performance as “teaching.” 
Without hesitation I can tell you that I am trying to teach or intending to teach because I 
am engaged in the commonly recognizable performance. I couldn’t tell you that what I 
am really trying to do is acting the part of Hamlet. This is to say that I recognize my 
intentions in the same way an actor recognizes he is playing the part of Hamlet and not 
Othello. In the same way, if a driver does not see the obstruction behind his car, we do 
not index the crash as intentional. To identify my intentions, is essentially to rely on 
tradition to identify the performance in which I am engaged.  
 
The Social Dimension of Experience 
 
A second pillar of contemporary humanism is individual experience. Precedence is given 
to the way in which the individual experiences the world for him/herself; it is on the basis 
of personal experience that the individual selects one course of action as opposed to 
another. Yet, when we honor the individual’s personal experience, to what process are we 
lending value? At least in the case of visual experience, psychologists have long drawn a 
distinction between sensation and perception. The former typically refers to the mere 
registering of sense data, for example, the way in which increasing intensity of light 
affects the nervous system. In contrast, perception typically refers to what might be 
viewed as meaningful experience, for example, the way in which we recognize the face 
of a friend, attend to whether a traffic signal is red or green, or register signs of 
impending danger. In my view, it is this capacity for perception from which the value we 
place on experience derives. Yet, if this is so, we find that our ability to perceive these 
things is pivotally dependent on our immersion in social process. Within Western culture 
we learn to attend to people’s faces, for example, and not their toes or ankles. And in the 
case of the face, we primarily focus on the eyes, and not the nostrils. It is through the 
eyes, we believe, that we have access to the other’s mind. Similarly, it is through cultural 
learning that we attend to traffic signals or darkened streets. We thus find that the act of 
perception is not that of an isolated mind, but is a social act.  
 In this light, consider the classic research in social psychology in which 
psychologists (Hastorf & Cantrill 1954) focused on students’ perceptions of a football 
game between Princeton and Dartmouth. The game was an especially rough one, with 
significant injuries on both sides. Yet, when queried about the game, 85% of the 
Princeton students said that Dartmouth had started the rough play, while only 36% of the 
Dartmouth students believed this was so. More dramatically, when shown a film of the 
game a week later, the Princeton students observed the Dartmouth team made over twice 
as many rule infractions as were seen by Dartmouth students. As the authors conclude, 
“…there is no such ‘thing’ as a ‘game’ existing ‘out there; in its own right which people 
merely ‘observe.’ The game ‘exists’ for a person and is experienced by him only insofar 
as certain happenings have significance in terms of his purpose.” Of course, “his 
purpose” in this case was fully dependent on his participation in a social process. As 
Hanson (1958) similarly concludes in the case of science, “When peering into the 
microscope, the biologist doesn’t see the same world we do.” (p. 67) Experience is not 
the act of a socially isolated mind. 
 Yet, from a relational perspective, how are we to account for the continuous swim 
of what we call private experience. We gaze alone into the distance and begin to think 
about our actions, plan what we shall do tomorrow, or find ourselves moved by feelings 
of love, grief, anger, and so on.  These experiences seem fully and uniquely one’s own, 
inside the head and body. In what sense, then, are these relational actions? In reply, 
consider first that what we often call thinking is linguistic in its form. When you are 
thinking about a paper you might write, for example, you are likely to be experiencing 
language. This is so often the case that we presume that writing and speaking are outward 
expressions of thought. But let us reverse the assumption: let us view thought in this case 
as a reflection of writing and speaking. Until we learn to use language, which is 
quintessentially a social process, we cannot begin to think about global warming, the 
possibility of God, or the effects of social media on our lives. In this sense, thinking is 
social action carried out in a minimal way. That is, it is social performance without the 
full voicing, accentuating gestures, and so on.  
 We may extend this logic to planning and feeling. We first acquire the capacity to 
plan within our ongoing relationships; later we can carry out this activity without making 
it fully public. Planning in silence is not a natural act, but an outgrowth of one’s 
participation in culture. Similarly with the emotions. There is a wide-ranging literature on 
cultural and historical variations in what are called the emotions. We do not have 
emotions, and then express them. Rather,  through our relationships we acquire the 
capacity to perform emotions (including conventions of when and where performances 
may occur). We are then enabled to participate in emotional life privately – without the 
fully embodied expressions. It is important to note that this does not mean that emotions 
(thought, planning, etc) are culturally determined. On the relational account, we abandon 
the determinism/voluntarism binary altogether. We are our relations, and private 
experience does not represent an exit.  
      
               Relational Humanism in Practice 
 
Given the constructed character of the person, we must finally turn to consequences of 
shifting from an individualized form of humanism to one centered in relational process. 
In the same way that we inquired into the social pragmatics of 20th century humanism, 
how are we to understand the lived potentials of a relational humanism? An extended 
account of how a relational orientation can inform our ways of life are discussed in my 
2009 book, Relational Being: Beyond self and community. O’Hara’s (1992) discussion of 
relational humanism and its contribution to a pluralist world is also illuminating. In both 
these and other works we find a relational orientation closely allied with a pluralist view 
of human meaning, one that invites professionals from multiple perspectives to share 
ideas and practices. It is through such sharing – as opposed to competing for the Truth – 
that humankind can flourish. Only one outcome of such pluralism is represented in the 
enormous flourishing of qualitative inquiry across the social sciences (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2011). It is to just such efforts that the counseling profession would now ally 
itself.  
 I turn finally to sketch several more specific implications of a relational shift in 
humanism. All of these draw from one distinct contrast between a traditional and 
relational orientation: while traditional humanism places a strong value on the well-being 
of the individual agent, relational humanism shifts the site of value to the relational 
process. Specifically, from the relational standpoint, the chief question is how does a 
given practice sustain or enrich the relational process? In my view, a relational 
orientation enables us to incorporate some of the most treasured aspects of traditional 
humanism, while adding significant new dimensions. Here I touch on practices of 
research, therapy and counseling, and everyday life.   
 
Relational Research Practices 
 
Humanist scholars in the social sciences have long decried the empiricist conception of 
research, championing as it does, a dispassionate and bad-faith relationship between the 
researcher and the “object” of his/her gaze. From a constructionist perspective the 
empiricist orientation is not necessarily ruled out. Again, much depends on the social 
consequences of such research. There are cases in which one might wish to employ such 
methods of research (e.g. predicting health and illness, or criminal recidivism), even 
while rejecting the implicit values. However, from the relational perspective advanced 
here, a relational orientation to research would carry a deep resonance with traditional 
humanism. The humanist values empathic concern for the well-being of those with whom 
one is carrying out research. This has often meant a shift from quantitative to qualitative 
research (Miller, Nash, & Fetty, 2014). Rather than the impersonal practices of assessing 
the other, and converting assessments to numbers, the humanist will seek a more personal 
relationship with the other. Most frequently the orientation is phenomenological or 
interpretive, with the primary aim of illuminating the subject’s lived experience.  
 For the relational humanist this concern for human well-being shifts from 
empathy with the subject, to caring for relational process. A caring respect for the 
research participant would be a means of valuing the relationship between researcher and 
the participant. However, for the relational humanist, the circle of concern then expands. 
For example, how will the participant’s actions be represented to the academic world? 
This is not only to be sensitive to one’s responsibility to the participant, but to one’s 
audience. As proposed elsewhere (Gergen, 2007a) the traditional forms of academic 
writing distance the author from the audience, typically creating a power relationship in 
which the author is privileged. Further, from the relational perspective, we question the 
tradition of addressing only an academic audience. For example, if attempting to 
represent the lives of marginal or otherwise “invisible” sub-cultures, why should the 
account be limited to an elite circle of scholars? Should researchers not expand their 
potentials for presenting their work to include forms of communication - art, 
photography, video, theater, and more – that may reach and engage the public at large? 
The interested reader might explore relevant examples of performative social sciences 
conducted with Mary Gergen (Gergen & Gergen, 2012).  
 For the relational humanist, the vistas of research are expanded far beyond the 
focus on lived experience. If the relational process is to be honored, there is also good 
reason to work more collaboratively with those who might otherwise serve as “subjects” 
of inquiry. Working collaboratively in both the process of inquiry and writing are invited. 
The increasingly popular field of action research, in which the professional works with 
groups of people in achieving valued ends, is rife with potential (Reason and Bradbury, 
2008). Illustrative here is Fine and Torre’s  (2006)  research assisting women in prison, 
Lykes’ (2001) community building work with rural Guatamalan women, and instances in 
which the classroom becomes a form of laboratory in participatory action (Wamba, 
2011). 
 
Relationships in Therapy and Counseling 
 
Humanist therapists and counselors have long provided a significant alternative to such 
mechanistic practices as cognitive-behavioral therapy. Rather than subjecting the client to 
a pre-fixed regimen, humanist therapists typically provide a context that provides 
maximal freedom, and enables the client full and unfettered expression. Existentially 
oriented therapy might serve as a prime example. As I see it, a relationally oriented 
humanist would offer the same freedoms. However, the care for relational process 
extends the therapist’s engagement in several ways. At the outset, for the relational 
humanist, whatever becomes defined as a problem has its roots in relational process. 
There are no “problems” outside the particular relational context, nor are there 
“solutions.” This means that the therapist or counselor’s attentions are not fixed on the 
personal feelings and experiences of the client. The client’s utterances do not originate 
within his or her independent mind, but are outgrowths of relational process. This 
process, then, invites caring attention. By the same token, the therapist or counselor is not 
responsible solely to the client, but to the entire web of relations carried by the client into 
the consultation chamber. It is not enough to assist the client in moving into a new pattern 
of action; one must also attend to the ramifications of this pattern within the relational 
matrix to which the client returns.  
 A relational perspective, as outlined here, also transforms the conception of 
human understanding. Traditional humanism has inherited a dualist conception of 
understanding, in which the attempt of the therapist is to understand the lived experience 
of the client. The attempt, then, is to empathically infer from the client’s words (and non-
verbal communication) that which lies within the “recesses of mind”. Two centuries of 
hermeneutic philosophy have demonstrated the impossibility of such understanding. And 
as I have outlined earlier, it is more useful to see meaning as emerging from the process 
of co-action. On this account, human understanding is not so much a matter of 
“penetrating the exterior,” as moving dialogically in such a way that a culturally 
recognized pattern of understanding results. Understanding is demonstrated not by 
knowing what’s on the other’s mind, but in accommodating or affirming actions. If you 
are explaining a complex issue to me, and I nod affirmatively, and say, “yes, yes…” you 
would tend to conclude that understanding was occurring. If you tell me about a family 
tragedy, and I tell you a funny story about my dog, you might well conclude that I was 
not an empathic person. Empathic understanding is achieved – or not -within the dance of 
co-action.  
 
Relational Process in Everyday Life 
 
The implications of relational humanism extend far beyond professional practices of 
research, therapy, or counseling. As humanist thinkers have long advocated, humanist 
ideas should inform our actions throughout the course of daily life. This is not the context 
for an extended account of the various ways in which a relational orientation would be 
realized in action. Rather, I conclude with two more general points. The first is concerned 
with our common orientation toward human responsibility. From the traditional humanist 
perspective, we are individually accountable for our actions. Both our everyday 
orientation to morality and our practices of law embody this orientation. Yet, from a 
relational perspective, such an orientation is limited (Gergen, 2007b). As proposed 
earlier, traditional humanism is largely blind to the broader systems of which the 
individual is but a part. A relational humanism brings the broader context of relations 
back into focus. We begin to attend very carefully to the relational processes in which we 
participate. This first means developing alternatives to placing exclusive blame on the 
individual, a practice that alienates and ultimately destroys the very process of relating 
itself. More generally, it means expanding on the concept of relational responsibility 
(McNamee & Gergen, 1999), a concept that invites our collective responsibility for the 
health and wellbeing, not of individual subjects, but to the processes out of which human 
flourishing emerges. 
 At the same time, a relational orientation invites us to expand the concept of 
humanism to include not only human flourishing in itself, but to the ways in which 
human relations are embedded in the more general environment. After all, human 
relations depend on their viability for an array of resources – both animate and inanimate. 
Indeed, one may raise the question of why we presume that the skin represents the 
boundary between self and environment. The world moves through us as we move 
through the world. Thus, we must finally see that a relational responsibility extends far 
beyond the network of what we have traditionally demarked as “human” subjects. It 
includes a commitment to the sustainability and enrichment of all those relational 
processes that together make up the world.  
   
                  In Conclusion 
 
In this offering I have outlined the possibilities for exploring a new historical turn in the 
continuously emerging conception of humanism. In particular, I am proposing a shift 
from a focus on the irreducible individual to one in which the individual cannot be 
separated from the larger relational processes of which he or she is a part. As Matthew 
Lemberger notes, humanists “are certainly on the precipice of ideological and practical 
extinction.” It is important that they do not “simply fade into the margins,” becoming a 
“relic of antiquity.” (Hansen, Speciale, & Lemberger, 2014, p. 170). A relational 
transformation in the humanist perspective not only sustains traditional critiques of 
mechanistic constructions of the person, but opens new vistas of theory and practice. 
Traditional concepts of experience, agency, and human understanding remain, now 
reconstructed in relational terms.  
 Yet, it must finally be underscored that a relational conception of the person is no 
less a social construction than the individualist account. We are not speaking here of a 
new truth, but a new form of understanding. As noted earlier, this does not mean 
abandoning the traditional view so much as exploring the consequences of a relational 
humanism for the profession, for the social sciences, and for society more generally. It is 
also to say that there are no grounds for the ethical implications of relational humanism, 
outside those that we can negotiate in our daily lives. There is no ultimate value in 
nourishing and enriching relational process (as opposed to the individual), save possibly 
the potential for such a value to replace the “war of all against all” with a more viable and 
flourishing existence.  
 In this respect, a relational turn invites humanists to join a global dialogue on such 
issues as sustainability, health care, education, peace building, social welfare, 
organizational change, regional development, and governance – all of which are spurred 
by visions of collaborative engagement. Humanist counselors and therapists are masters 
in the art of dialogue (Cooper et al., 2012). By understanding these practices in relational 
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